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CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND RULE 
CONSTRUCTION THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann s 7L; 1-102, infra. 
1 • intra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HA S I I DT "'! U I EE I IIS R 1 3H1 TC A PPEA I ,„ NOR IS THE 
APPEAL MOOT. 
Respondent entitles Point I of their brief, page 15, as 
:: o... I ows: " Appe 11 ai .
 L ^ ,-. 
Receipt and Release". 
Waiver has been defined and restated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
935 (Utah 1993) as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of 
a known right. To constitute waiver, there 
must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish i t (citing cases) 
We further clarify that the intent 
relinquish a right must be distinct. 
to 
Therefore, Respondents must show that the execution of the Receipt 
and Release by Appellant: (R 6 90) coi ist::i tn ites tl le ai moui iceinei it c f ai I 
existing right, Appellant's right to appeal, Appellant's knowledge 
of the right to appeal and Appellant's distinct intention to 
relinquish the said right of appeal. 
Nowhere in the Estate Closing Order (R.683-688) or the 
Receipt and Release or in any other documentation is there a 
reference to Appellant's right to appeal much less his distinct 
intention to waive the right of appeal. 
Respondents are also trying to elevate the Receipt and 
Release to the status of an independent document having a life of 
its own to be construed under the "Four Corners Rule." The Receipt 
and Release is a part of the Estate Closing Order and is therein 
referred to as having been received and in fact is the basis for 
the signing of the Estate Closing Order by the Court. The Estate 
Closing Order is specifically referred to as being appealed in 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal. (R.691) 
Respondents argue from the case of Krauss v. Utah State 
Dept. of Transportation, 852 P. 2d 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) at page 
15 of their brief, "[F]or a release to be enforceable, it must at 
minimum be unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal." 
The entire text of the Receipt and Release (R.690) is as 
follows: 
The undersigned, Dylon Husband, as distributee 
and heir of the above estate hereby: 
1, Acknowledges receipt from JERRALD D. 
CONDER and JOHN SPENCER SNOW, the 
personal representative of the above 
named decedent, of all property to which 
distributee is entitled from the estate. 
2. Accepts such property in full payment and 
satisfaction of the undersigned's 
interest in the estate. 
2 
3-; Releases the personal representatives and 
the estate from any and all liability in 
connection with the undersigned's 
interest in the estate. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This is hardly an "unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal" waiver or 
release of Appellant's right of appeal contemplated in the case 
cited. 
Likewise, the requirements for an accord and satisfaction 
are set forth in the case of Lawrence Construction Co. vs. 
Holmquist, 692 P.2d 382, 384 as follows: 
1. A proper subject matter; 
2. Competent parties; 
3. An assessment or meeting of the minds of the 
parties; 
4. Consideration given for the record. 
An accord and satisfaction requires a meeting of the 
minds of the parties. The text of the Receipt and Release, supra, 
is once again called to the attention of the Court. 
There is clearly no assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties in the above text insofar as Appellant waiving his right to 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. All acknowledgements, payments 
in full and satisfaction and releases from liability have to do 
with the closing of the estate and nothing to do with the waiver of 
the right of appeal. 
Appellant was entitled to and received the personal 
property and cash from the estate pursuant to the Estate Closing 
Order and not the Receipt and Release. Receipt of the property and 
negotiating the check for $9,958.99 provides no consideration for 
the purported accord, waiver or release of the right to appeal. 
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Appellant's acceptance of the benefits was under 
compulsion. If Appellant failed to sign the "Receipt and Release," 
he would not be provided with the balance of personal property not 
yet delivered or would not have received his check. See Exhibit 1 
to Appellant's Response to Suggestion of Mootness; see Exhibits 
"C, " "E," and "G" to Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness. 
The issue of the check on January 6, 1992 was also a 
proposition of no fax by Appellant's attorney approving the 
"Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds" and no signature by Appellant 
on the "Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds," there was to be no 
check given to Appellant. See Exhibit 2 to Appellant's Response to 
Suggestion of Mootness; see Exhibit "I" to Appellee's Suggestion of 
Mootness. 
The issue of mootness of an appeal has been before the 
Utah Appellate Courts and other appellate courts throughout the 
country for at least 130 years. The authorities generally refer to 
the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine and are as follows: 
A* General Rule. 
As a general rule the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine 
would preclude a party who accepted the benefits of a Judgment or 
Order from Appealing the said Judgment or Order. 
Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987) and Cignolani v. 
Utah Power & Light CO., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Exception-Appeal for a Larger Amount. 
This exception is recognized in 169 A.L.R. 985, 1026 as 
follows: 
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"...if the appeal or assignment of error is 
such as to confine the review, and the 
possible further proceedings resulting from 
it, to the right of the party to an additional 
amount, his acceptance of the share awarded 
him will not bar his right to the review.*** 
The usual case in which the distributee does 
not lose his right of appeal by accepting his 
share is that in which he contests the credits 
allowed the distributor; for example, where 
his objection is to items of losses or 
expenses in an administrator's account. 
There is one condition to this exception which is also 
set forth in 169 A.L.R. 95, 1026 as follows: 
Conversely, if the review is such as to 
involve the possibility that any part of the 
share accepted may go to the other 
distributees or be returned to the 
distributor, the party is barred by his 
acceptance. 
The award of the personal property and cash award in the 
sum of $9,958.99 to Appellant are not put in issue by Appellant's 
Appeal nor are these specific awards to Appellant challenged in the 
Crossappeals of Appellees per their brief on appeal. The foregoing 
condition is subject to another exception as explained in 169 
A.L.R. 95, 1018 as follows: 
But in such cases the right of review is not 
absolutely conditional upon the acceptors's 
right to what he has received being outside 
the issues raised on appeal, or beyond danger 
of being retried. It means that the right to 
what he has received shall not be put in 
jeopardy by his own proceeding. It may still 
be endangered by his opponent's cross appeal, 
or cross assignments of error, where such are 
possible under the practice. (emphasis added) 
Neither Appellant's Appeal nor Appellee's Crossappeal 
directly challenge the award of personal property and cash to 
5 
Appellant and, therefore, this condition of the exception is 
fulfilled. 
This exception to the general rule has been applied to 
heirs, claimants, and other distributees of probate estates since 
the early times. In case of Hiabe v. Westlake, 14 N.Y. 281 (1856) 
New York Court of Appeals held as follows at 14 N.Y. 288: 
There is no weight in the objection that the 
creditors who appealed had received their 
dividends under the decree of the surrogate. 
(Clowes v. Dickenson, 8 Cow., 328, 331.) They 
were certainly entitled to the amount paid 
them, and there was no inconsistency on their 
part in receiving that amount, and then 
appealing for the purpose of obtaining a 
reduction of the allowance for expenses, which 
would give them a further divided. 
Likewise in the case of In Re Claris Estate. 213 P. 222 
(1923), the California Supreme Court held at 212 P.624 as follows: 
It is well settled that an appellant is not 
precluded from maintaining an appeal for the 
purpose of establishing a greater claim where 
it appears that he is entitled to that which 
he has accepted but is claiming something 
more. 
The following appears at 169 A.L.R. 986, 1026: 
And where a plaintiff claimed by inheritance 
one half an estate, but the court held him 
entitled to only one fourth, he was held 
entitled to maintain an appeal notwithstanding 
he had accepted distribution of the one-fourth 
interest that interest not being controverted. 
Mudd v. Perry (1928; CCA 8th) 25 F.2d 85 (writ 
of certiorari denied in (1928) 278 US 601, 73 
L ed 529, 49 S Ct. 9). 
The Appeal of Appellant is maintained to recover a larger 
amount of money for the heirs and is properly brought. 
C. Exception-Separate and Distinct Orders and/or 
6 
Judgments. 
Another exception to the general rule is set forth in the 
case of Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973) 
at 514 P.2d 1143 as follows: 
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a 
controversy, which is separate and distinct 
from another part, and the disposition of the 
latter cannot affect the disposition of the 
former, a party may accept the money or 
property to which he is entitled, and not be 
deemed to waive his right to appeal as to 
other independent claims which the court 
refused to grant. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order signed 
and entered on February 7, 1992 awarded Conder & Wangsgard, as 
claimants, $34,038.81 at attorney's fees for services rendered 
Decedent prior to his death. The Order was separate and distinct 
from the Estate Closing Order entered on October 19, 1992. The 
Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution was not 
even filed until April 20, 1992. 
If Appellant was to prevail in whole or in part on his 
issue then there would be additional money (property) for the heirs 
upon remand and a new Personal Representative could be appointed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1008, infra, to collect the said 
property in whole or in part from Conder & Wangsgard. 
D. Utah Cases. 
The Utah cases that adopted the acceptance-of-the-
benefits doctrine, Trees v. Lewis, supra, and Cianolani v. Utah 
Power and Light Co. . supra, are clearly distinguishable on the 
facts from the case at bar. Trees v. Lewis was a specific 
7 
performance action lost by seller who unsuccessfully attempted to 
appeal after giving possession of the subject property to buyer and 
accepting the purchase price therefor. Cianolani was two cases 
where plaintiffs were awarded judgments against defendant Utah 
Power, which were paid and accepted by plaintiffs who then, 
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal. 
Cianolani, supra, contains the following language at 790 
P.2d 1221: 
The general rule requiring dismissal of cases 
in which the issues have become moot is the 
product advisory opinions. (citing cases) 
Where mootness is the suggested basis for 
application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits 
doctrine, our focus is not on appellant's 
intent or on the opposing party's reliance on 
appellant's conduct. Instead, we must 
determine whether an appellant's conduct in 
accepting the benefits of, or in acquiescing 
in, the judgment or order appealed from has 
rendered our resolution of the issues on 
appeal a purely academic exercise. 'If the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants, the case is moot...' 
The Court of Appeals then concluded at 790 P.2d 1222: 
There is no longer any settlement money on 
deposit with the clerk of the district court, 
and there is no basis on which either the 
trial court or a party successful on appeal 
could compel the other party's return of the 
disbursed funds to the district court for 
redistribution. 
There was a key consideration in the court's decision to dismiss 
the appeal. 
This case is a probate matter and the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code provides the following in Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1008: 
If other property of the estate is discovered 
after an estate has been settled and the 
8 
personal representative discharged or after 
one year after a closing statement has been 
filed, the court upon petition of any 
interested person and upon notice as it 
directs may appoint the same or a successor 
personal representative to administer the 
subsequently discovered estate. If a new 
appointment is made, unless the court orders 
otherwise, the provisions of this code apply 
as appropriate; but no claim previously barred 
may be asserted in the subsequent 
administration. 
So, when this Court reverses in whole or in part some of 
the improper, excessive and exorbitant attorney's fees awarded 
Conder & Wangsgard and sends the case back to District Court, a new 
personal representative can be appointed to pursue Conder & 
Wangsgard for a return of some of the fees and there is a remedy 
for Appellant and the matter does not amount to giving an advisory 
opinion. 
The Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant appeals the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of February 7, 1992 
in addition to the Estate Closing Order. 
Respondents further claim that allowing Appellant's 
appeal which have a chilling effect on future estate 
administrations. No so. The main thrust of the appeal is 
challenging the claim against the Estate by Conder & Wangsgard, the 
Conder thereof being a co-personal representative of the Estate, in 
the sum of $37,820.81 of which $34,038.81 was finally allowed by 
the Court. (R. 431-438). Personal Representatives did not seek a 
ruling under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to start 
the appeal time running which they most certainly would have 
received. 
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Thus, the largest single item being challenged on appeal 
is the claim allowed by the trial court which due to the neglect of 
the Personal Representatives was left open for the final appeal 
from the Estate Closing Order. The remainder of the appeal deals 
with a surcharge of Personal Representatives in the sum of 
$1,337.30 and a challenge to the amount of Personal Representatives 
attorney's fees of which $5,000.00 was disallowed by the trial 
court. See Point III, Appellant's brief, page 29. 
Thus, the chilling effect of this case on future estate 
administration if at all, is due (1) to the neglect of Personal 
Representatives in failing to obtain a 54(b) ruling on the claim 
decided in February, 1992, and (2) the greed, avarice, dishonesty, 
lying under oath, breach of fiduciary duty and general mishandling 
of Decedent's estate. Personal Representative Jerrald D. Conder of 
Conder & Wangsgard testified at R. 1467 as follows: 
Mr. Husband [Decedent] was -- you have to 
understand, he was at our office probably 
three times a week either on a friendly basis, 
either there drinking with us, either there 
planning a fishing trip, being at the swimming 
pool, he was our close personal friend and he 
know what that billing was. 
And again at R. 1425 as follows: 
I was concerned initially that Whitey's 
[Decedent's] children [including Appellant] 
were taken care of. 
Finally at R. 1120 as follows: 
...you must understand that Mr. Husband 
[Decedent] was one my best and dearest friends. 
The law firm of Conder & Wangsgard received a total of 
$68,409.96 representing the claim, attorney's fees and Personal 
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Representative fees (which were allowed at the same rate as 
attorney's fees) and paralegal costs out of an estate with a total 
value of $155,784.83 of which $53,158.56 went to both heirs. (R. 
437, 438, 459, 683-688) 
With friends like Conder probating your estate, you 
certainly don't need any enemies. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW THAT THE CONDER & WANGSGARD CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AGAINST THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $37,820.81 WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
(75-3-804) AND TIMELY FILED (75-3-803). 
The language from Dementes v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d 
628 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) quoted at page 27 of Respondent's brief is 
inapposite in that it refers to "a claim not yet due." Thus, the 
disavowal of "undue precision" refers to claims not yet due. The 
claim of Conder & Wangsgard against the estate was due and payable 
long before Decedent's death. 
Respondents and the Court of Appeals rely heavily on the 
preamble to Utah Code Ann. §75-1-102 (1975) in divining a liberal 
construction to the presentation of creditors claims. 
The full text of 75-1-102 (1975) is as follows: 
75-1-102. Purposes -- Rule of construction. 
(1) This code shall be liberally construed 
and applied to promote its underlying purposes 
and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code 
are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law 
concerning the affairs of decedents, 
missing persons, protected persons, 
minors, and incapacitated persons; 
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(b) To discover and make effective the 
intent of a decedent in distribution of 
his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient 
system for administering the estate of 
the decedent and making distribution to 
his successors; 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of 
certain trusts; and 
(e) To make uniform the law among the 
various jurisdictions. 
Thus, the underlying purpose and policies of this statute 
make no express reference to creditors claims. It is submitted 
that the language of Utah Code Ann. §78-3-803 and 804 is mandatory 
and should be given a reasonably strict construction in order to 
protect decedent's estates and the heirs and devisees and provide 
for the expeditious probate, distribution and closing of the same. 
Respondents' brief claims at page 33: "Dylon is again 
disingenuous when he states, 'There is not on scintilla or iota of 
evidence to support Finding of Fact 8'." 
Finding of Fact 8 (R. 435) is a follows: 
8. The individual entries on Exhibit 3, time 
record of Jerrald D. Conder for services 
rendered for Decedent in the Deep Power 
litigation, were made and entered on Exhibit 3 
at the time of the service was performed for 
Decedent. 
Conder's testimony at (R. 1031-1032) has to do with the totals 
placed on Exhibit 3 and nothing to do with individual entries in 
Exhibit 3 and when they were made. To reiterate, there is not a 
scintilla or iota of evidence to support Finding of Fact 8. In 
fact, Conder's affidavit states that Exhibit 3 was not prepared 
until shortly after his appointment as Personal Representative. (R. 
383, 384; 1044-1048) 
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The claim of Conder & Wangsgard about a secured claim and 
their attorney's lien at page 34 and 35 of their brief is being 
raised for the first time on appeal. This should not be considered 
by the court as it was not raised and articulated in the court 
below. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AT THE JUNE 14, 1991 HEARING. 
The precipitate for Conder7s re-redirect examination was 
not to clarify his earlier quandary as to when the fees were 
totaled but on cue from the trial court in assessing the state of 
the evidence at (R.1029), page 24 of Appellant's brief. It was 
evident that there was no claim or formal claim filed before 
September 24, 1990. Conder's testimony in the morning of June 14, 
1991 supported this assessment of the posture of the case by the 
trial court. 
The trial court allowed Conder to testify in the 
afternoon session over the objection of Appellant's counsel without 
giving any reason therefor. (R. 1030) Over the further objection 
to Appellant's attorney and a Motion to Strike on the grounds that 
Conder was trying to correct his testimony (a euphemism for lying 
under oath) the trial court responded, "He has a right to do that 
on redirect." (emphasis added) (R. 1034) This was an abuse of 
discretion on the part of trial court allowing the re-redirect when 
there was no recross examination. Further, the clarification or 
correction of testimony went to his direct examination. This abuse 
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of discretion was harmful to Appellant because it improperly 
allowed Conder to make the claim more colorable under the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 803 and 804. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SURCHARGE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE CONDER FOR THE INTEREST NOT EARNED BY HIS FAILURE TO 
DEPOSIT ESTATE FUNDS IN AN INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT. 
In the hearing on January 15, 1991 on Appellant's 
Petition to Remove Conder as Personal Representative of the Estate, 
the trial court ruled summarily from the Bench, that the estate 
funds were to be put in an interest bearing account. (R. 903) 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT ONLY $5,000.00 
INSTEAD OF $11,550.00 IN ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE INCURRED IN 
PROSECUTING THE CLAIM OF CONDER & WANGSGARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN 
THE SUM OF $37,820.81. 
On June 15, 1992 a hearing was held setting a further 
hearing on June 23, 1992. (R. 581) On June 19, 1992 Appellant's 
attorney submitted a statement and analysis of attorney's fees to 
be used in the hearing held on June 23, 1992. (R. 582-594) A 
further hearing was held on these attorney's fees on August 20, 
1992 and the matter of these attorney's fees submitted to the court 
at that time. (R. 1565, 1566) 
At the request of the trial court, Appellant's attorney 
sent to the trial court on September 2, 1992 the requested 
documents and a copy of the documents were sent to Conder & 
14 
Wangsgard. (R. 649-663) Thus, the ex parte documents referred to 
at page 43 of Respondents' brief were not ex parte. This issue of 
attorney's fees was finally determined by the trial court by minute 
entry on November 24, 1992. (R. 664, 665) 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is properly before the court and is not moot 
for any reason. The award of $37,820.81 to Conder & Wangsgard for 
attorney's fees was error and should be reversed. The trial court 
abused its discretion regarding the admission of the re-redirect 
testimony of Conder and Appellant should be awarded a new trial. 
The court should find a duty on the part of Personal 
Representatives to deposit estate funds they are holding in an 
interest bearing account and Personal Representative Conder should 
be surcharged for the amount of interest lost for this failure to 
do so. This ruling of the court should be reversed. The evidence 
is overwhelming that Conder & Wangsgard spent $11,500.00 worth of 
time processing their claim against the estate and the ruling of 
the trial court disallowing only $5,000.00 should be reversed and 
the full amount of $11,500.00 should entered as a disallowance as 
against Conder & Wangsgard as a matter of law. The court should 
order proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 1008 to recover whatever 
attorney's fees are disallowed on this appeal from Conder & 
Wangsgard. 
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
VI. 
Whether the trial court properly concluded that the 
attorney's fee claim of Conder & Wangsgard should be discounted by 
10%. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which should 
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to 
said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) . 
Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is 
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard. Robb 
v. Anderton. 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
VII. 
Whether the trial court properly awarded Appellant's 
attorney $1,000.00 for his services to the estate. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which should 
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to 
said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) . 
Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is 
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard. Robb 
v. Anderton. 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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VIII. 
Whether the trial court properly disallowed the post-
funeral final party at the Fort Douglas-Hidden Valley Country Club. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which should 
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to 
said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. . 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) . 
Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is 
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard. Robb 
v. Anderton, 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
IX. 
Whether the trial court was correct in not charging any 
of the Co-Personal Representatives attorney's fees to Appellant 
Dylon Husband. 
This is an issue involving a question of law which should 
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to 
said ruling. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) . 
Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is 
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard. Robb 
v. Anderton, 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTION, STATUTORY AND RULE DETERMINATION 
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE ISSUES. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1008. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
See Appellant's Brief, page 3. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
See Appellant's Brief, page 4. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT VI 
The evidence is ample to support the trial court's 
finding that the Conder & Wangsgard fee should be discounted 10% 
and in fact there was no evidence contradicting the supplemental 
agreement of Conder and Decedent to allow the payment of the 
attorney's fees by a remodel job on the Conder & Wangsgard office. 
POINT VII 
There is ample evidence to support the award of $1,000.00 
as attorney's fees for the reduction of the Conder & Wangsgard fee 
by $3,782.08. In addition, the award made by the trial court was 
for services rendered to the estate without reference to the 
foregoing which services included the disallowance of the $1,722.71 
claim for the "final party" and the $5,000.00 disallowed as against 
Conder & Wangsgard estate attorney's fees which is an additional 
benefit to the estate of $6,722.21 for a total benefit of 
$10,504.79. The award of $1,000.00 to Appellant's attorney is 
supported by the evidence and is a reasonable and proper charge 
against the estate. 
POINT VIII 
The cost of the alleged "wake" was $1,722.71 and was 
organized by Conder before his appointment as Personal 
Representative and in advance consultation with everyone else 
except the heirs and their conservators. See Exhibit 9. The 
"final party" was for non-church goers that abhorred the church 
funeral and for whom Relief Society punch and cookies was 
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unacceptable. This was not a continuation of the funeral, but a 
"final party11 that "pandered to the appetite of the living under 
the pretense of honoring the dead." The claim was properly 
disallowed against the estate and reallocated against the 
responsible parties. 
POINT IX 
The surcharges were either allowed, on appeal or 
disallowed and in any event there was significant evidence to 
support them all. The claim for Conder & Wangsgard attorney's fees 
for services rendered Decedent prior to his death was brought 
before the court on the Personal Representative's petition for 
Conder & Wangsgard because of Mr. Snow's failure to fulfill his 
duties as Co-Personal Representative under the stipulation. All of 
Appellant's actions regarding the estate were taken in good faith, 
were meritorious or debatable and the trial court finding of no 
basis to award fees against Appellant is supported by overwhelming 
evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ATTORNEY'S 
FEE CLAIM BY CONDER & WANGSGARD SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 10% BASED ON 
MULTIPLE FINDINGS OF FACT AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court made the following findings of fact 
relating to this issue at (R. 431-436): 
2. In 1985 Decedent and Jerrald D. Conder of 
Conder & Wangsgard entered into an oral 
agreement whereby Conder & Wangsgard would 
provide legal services to Decedent for $105.00 
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per hour. There is no written agreement, note 
or memorandum of this agreement. 
3. A further oral agreement was entered into 
between Jerrald D. Conder of Conder & 
Wangsgard and Decedent whereby Decedent would 
be allowed to provide remodeling construction 
for the offices of Conder & Wangsgard as 
credit against legal services provided by 
Conder & Wangsgard. 
5. The remodeling job to be performed by 
Decedent was contemplated and plans had been 
drawn but was not performed because of the 
sudden death of Decedent on May 27, 1990. 
14. There was a conflict of interest between 
Jerrald D. Conder of Conder & Wangsgard and 
Jerrald D. Conder as the Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Donald Chad 
Husband because of the (1) large claim of 
Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees and (2) 
and because Jerrald D. Conder as Personal 
Representative assumed control of Chad Husband 
Construction Company, Inc. which was supposed 
to provide the remodel job of the Conder & 
Wangsgard offices on payment of the legal 
services provided by Conder & Wangsgard. 
Jerrald D. Conder took no steps as Personal 
Representative to have the remodel job 
performed. 
15. If Decedent's construction company had 
performed the remodeling job on the offices of 
Conder & Wangsgard, Decedent would have earned 
a profit of 10% on the $37,820.81 claims by 
Conder & Wangsgard and is entitled to a credit 
therefor. 
All of Conder's testimony cited by Respondent's Brief at page 46 
supports findings of fact 2 and 3. Conder went on to testify at 
[By Mr. Conder] 
At the time he died there was plans for him to 
do a remodel. 
Q. That's right. He was going do the remodel, wasn't 
he, to pay for the attorney's fees. 
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A. What would have happened there, yes, at the time he 
died we had plans drawn for a remodel and we didn't know 
yet what the total cost of the remodel would be. But 
there was a plan that Mr. Husband would accomplish that 
remodel and there would be a credit on his bill, that we 
would agree upon some credit on the bill, yes. 
Conder's affidavit (R. 382-386) corroborates and directly supports 
his foregoing testimony. (R. 383) 
The trial court then ruled at (R. 1295) : 
The Court: But that wasn't the deal. The 
deal was that I will exchange my services for 
your services. 
Mr. Bennett: Well, that was one of the 
alternative ways. It was never agreed that it 
was the only way it could be done. 
The Court: He TConderl said that was the 
agreement. There was nothing to the contrary. 
I have no evidence to the contrary. (emphasis 
added) 
Thereafter, the trial court directed the parties to 
submit affidavits on the amount of the discount to be applied to 
the claim for attorney's fees which was accomplished by the 
parties. (R. 396-399; 401-408) On January 21, 1992, the trial 
court made a detailed ruling on the determination of the 10% 
discount. (R. 1327-1329) Cross-Appellant's brief, page 48, objects 
to the trial court's use of the case of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken 
764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988) to order a 10% reduction in fees. The 
trial merely remembered at (R. 941) that Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, supra, sets forth the criteria for determining the 
reasonableness of fees. 
Cross-Appellant's brief then state at page 48: 
Dixie sets forth the standards for courts to 
use in determining reasonable fees for a fee 
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award. The Conder & Wangsgard claim was not a 
fee award but was a creditor claim already 
outstanding against the estate. 
However, the Conder & Wangsgard creditor claim was for attorney's 
fees and to claim that Dixie State Bank, supra, is not applicable 
is ridiculous. Nowhere in the record did the trial court reduce 
the award by 10% based on the Dixie State Bank case, supra. The 
10% reduction is based on the testimony of Conder and his affidavit 
above referred to and cited. 
Cross-Appellant' s have failed to marshall the facts in 
support of findings of fact 2, 3, 5, 14 and 15, and demonstrate 
"that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom 
are insufficient to support the findings." Robb v. Anderton, 225 
UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The trial court's factual determinations as set forth in 
findings of fact 2, 3, 5, 14 and 15 are essentially undisputed and 
the discount of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for fees was legally 
correct and should be affirmed. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY WAS ENTITLED TO THE $1,000.00 AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HIS SERVICES TO THE ESTATE. 
Findings of fact 13 and 14 (R. 677) of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on October 19, 1992 (R. 672-
682) found that the estate benefited by $3,782.08 representing the 
discount of 10% from the Conder & Wangsgard award of attorney's 
fees. Appellant's attorney was awarded $1,000.00 therefor. 
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However, the minute entry upon which Finding of Fact 13 
and 14 are based (R. 664, 665) states as follows: 
Since the estate benefited as a result of Mr. 
Abies efforts the court awards Mr. Abies 
$1,000.00 for his service. 
The services rendered the estate by Appellant's attorney 
go far beyond the reduction of $3,782.08 of the Conder & Wangsgard 
fees. The services include the challenging and surcharge of the 
estate and Lindsay Husband of $1,722.71 for the post-funeral final 
party (Point VIII, infra) and the $5,000.00 disallowed solely 
through the efforts of Appellant's Attorney from the $11,550.00 
originally asserted improperly against the Estate. (See Point V, 
supra.) The trial court ruled as follows at (R. 767): 
The Court: I understand what happened there 
because I ruled on it. The estate did benefit 
the difference between the claim and the 
amount of the discount, so it was some benefit 
to the estate. 
Thus, the estate benefited by the efforts of Appellant's counsel in 
increasing the amount available to the heirs by the total sum of 
$10,504.79. This was what the court was aware of when it made its 
minute entry, supra. 
It is submitted that the award of $1,000.00 as attorney's 
fees to Appellant's attorney is overwhelmingly reasonable in light 
of the criteria set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, supra. 
Cross-Appellant's have failed to marshall the facts in 
support of Findings of Fact 13 and 14 and demonstrate "that the 
evidence in common, including all reasonable inferences therefrom 
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are insufficient to support the findings." Robb v. Anderton, 
supra. 
POINT VIII 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S DISALLOWANCE OF THE $1,722.71 
COSTS OF THE POST-FUNERAL FINAL PARTY AND THE REALLOCATION OF ITS 
COST TO CONDER & WANGSGARD AND KAREN HUSBAND IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE 
EVIDENCE. 
Decedent died on May 27, 1990 (R. 2) and his funeral was 
held at a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints ward on May 
31, 1990. (R. 790) Decedent had a membership in the Fort Douglas-
Hidden Valley Country Club which was sold as part of the 
administration of the estate for the sum of $1,318.00. (R. 78) 
Conder, before he was named personal representative, 
organized a post-funeral party to be held at the aforesaid country 
club. (R. 790, 791) Conder testified that he consulted with the 
Decedent's father and mother, brother and sister, the sister's 
husband, and Decedent's fiancee, girlfriend, live-in or whatever, 
about holding a party at the Hidden Valley Country Club (R. 790) 
He further testified at (R. 791) : 
A. It was a joint idea. ***and it was 
consensus among the group that that would be 
an appropriate function in honor of Chad's 
life. 
Q. Well, who was going to pay for this? You weren't 
personal representative on May 31, 1990. Who was going 
to pay for this party? 
A. The estate. 
Q. You had already made that determination at that 
time? 
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A. No, I perceived that whoever was going to be the 
personal representative would acknowledge that as a 
legitimate expense as the -- as I subsequently 
acknowledged flowers and the other funeral expenses that 
were incurred. 
Exhibit 9 was admitted into evidence (R. 792) and was 
Conder's letter explaining to Co-Personal Representative Snow the 
"final party" which he know characterizes loftily as a "wake." 
Conder, in his letter, explains: 
Many of Chads friends, indeed a great majority 
of his friends, were non church goers and 
abhorred the concept of the type of funeral 
that Chad's mother planned for him. Chad 
would absolutely have been appalled at a 
church service. *** As a friend of Chads 
family I spoke with his sister Karen DeVrese 
about his mothers funeral plans. I also spoke 
with Chads intended Diane and his brother Ron. 
*** Additionally, since Diane, Karen and Ethel 
are not exactly what you would call 
fundamentalist Christians, we felt it would be 
appropriate to have an event where they could 
feel comfortable and could greet their friends 
and relatives. In short, a Mormon Ward house 
is not a place where any of those who came 
would feel comfortable. Punch and cookies 
from the Relief Society, although nice for 
Elaine Husband, was not what Whity would have 
wanted. *** If Ethel and or her attorney are 
critical of this event or the expenditure they 
are more petty than I thought. 
Conder was examined on this letter at (R. 793) as 
follows: 
Q. Well, I just asked you if the letter is 
truthful and correct. 
A. I have no reason -- yeah, sure. 
There's no claim of a consultation with Dylon, Lindsay, Ethel or 
Karen prior to the party. Dylon, Lindsay, Ethel and Karen attended 
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the party, but no one specifically authorized the same in advance 
of the party. 
Karen Husband testified that she thought the party would 
have been what Decedent wanted and she tried to pass the "final 
party," off as a continuation of the funeral (R. 855-857). Based 
on the foregoing evidence, the trial court entered the following 
Findings of Fact: 
22. Subsequent to the funeral of decedent, 
personal representative Jerrald D. Conder and 
Karen Husband, guardian for Lindsay Husband, 
an heir of decedent, authorized a party, or 
"wake", in honor of decedent which was held at 
Hidden Valley Country Club. 
23. The cost of this "wake" was $1,772.21 
which amount was paid for from estate assets. 
24. The Court finds that this expense is not 
properly chargeable to the estate and that the 
cost of this "wake" should be borne equally by 
personal representative Jerrald D. Conder and 
Lindsay Husband's share of the estate. (R. 
678) 
Once again Cross-Appellants have failed to marshall the facts in 
support of Findings of Fact 22, 23 and 24 and demonstrate "that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom are 
insufficient to support the findings. Robb v. Anderton, supra. 
Funeral expenses is defined in 34 C.J.S., Executors and 
Administrators § 384, page 137 as follows: 
The term "funeral expenses" has reference to 
those necessary and compulsory expenditures 
which arise immediately on and after the death 
of decedent, and which embrace the coffining, 
embalming, arraying, and sepulture or 
cremation of his body, together with those 
accustomed forms and ceremonies which attend 
on the present disposition of his remains. 
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And in Caswell v« Harry Miller Excavating Co., 246 N.E2d 921, 924, 
(1969) : 
The term "funeral expenses" includes necessary 
expenditures arising from death of deceased 
person for embalming, purchase of coffin, 
burial or cremation, customary rites or 
ceremonies attending disposition of remains, 
and expenditures for burial lots and vaults. 
And with respect to a legitimate "wake" in the case of In Re 
Johnson/ s Estate. 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 1, 3 (1890) the court ruled as 
follows: 
If the evidence had shown that the wake, which 
preceded the burial of the decedent, was made 
an occasion of feasting or intemperance, its 
expenses as an item of funeral charges, should 
have been disallowed. There is, however, 
nothing reprehensible in the custom of 
watching at night over a corpse; *** So the 
courts, *** have refused to burden an estate 
with the cost of a ceremony which, under the 
pretense of honoring the dead, simply pandered 
to the appetites of the living. The fare 
which in this instance was provided for the 
guests and mourners was not open to this 
criticism, and was exceptionally frugal; it 
consisted of cheese and crackers and tobacco. 
A banquet less provocative of hilarity could 
not be imagined. 
There is no basis in law for allowing the "final party, " 
as an expense of the Estate and the trial court properly disallowed 
this charge and reallocated it against Conder and Wangsgard's 
attorney's fees and the heir whose mother-conservator thought it 
was what Chad wanted and was appropriate. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND NO BASIS TO CHARGE APPELLANT DYLON 
HUSBAND WITH ANY OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FEES OR ATTORNEY'S 
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FEES INCURRED BY THE ESTATE WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court made Finding of Fact 9 (R. 676), in the 
final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 672-682) used to 
support the Estate Closing Order. (R. 683, 684) Finding of Fact 9 
is a follows: 
The Court finds that there is no basis for 
charging personal representatives or attorneys 
fees incurred in conjunction with the 
administration of the estate directly to Dylon 
Husband. 
1. Cross-Appellants first attack the Petition to 
surcharge Personal Representative Conder (R. 464-479) as being 
without merit. A look at these seven causes of action is in order. 
A. The First Cause of Action claims negligence, 
bad faith, conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty 
costing the Estate $113,755.00. This claim had sufficient merit to 
necessitate a full blown hearing on July 2, 1992. (R. 1158-1226) 
Appellant called two witnesses and adduced substantial evidence to 
support his claims. The trial court made a ruling on the evidence 
in favor of Personal Representative Conder and nowhere did the 
court state that the claim was without merit. (R. 122 6) 
B. The Second Cause of Action had to with the 
interest on the estate funds which is before the court in 
Appellant's brief, Point IV, page 31 and in Appellee's brief, Point 
IV, page 39. 
C. The Third Cause of Action had to do with the 
"final party" and is before this court in Appellee's brief, Point 
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VIII, page 52 and in Cross-Appellant's brief, Point VIII. 
D. The Fourth Cause of Action charged that Diane 
Mills, the fiancee, girlfriend, live-in, etc., of Decedent at the 
time of his death was also a former client of Conder & Wangsgard 
and Conder as Personal Representative allowed Mills to live in 
Decedent's solely owned home at 1539 East Harvard Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah rent free for 2% months after he became Personal 
Representative. The reasonable rental value of the property would 
have been $750.00 per month or a total of $2,062.50. The evidence 
clearly showed that Mills was a former client of Conder's and he 
allowed her to live in the house after Decedent's death on a rent 
free basis. (R. 798-801) 
E. The Fifth Cause of Action claims Conder allowed 
Diane Mills to use Decedent's 1988 Chevrolet Camero IROC Z from the 
date of Decedent's death to September, 1990, a period of three 
months, in which Mills put 8,000 miles on the vehicle. The 
evidence adduced by Plaintiff showed that the fair rental value was 
$800.00 per month (R. 747-748) and that Conder either allowed or 
was aware and failed to object to the use of the car by Mills (R. 
801-804; 840-843) and should have been surcharged $2,400.00. 
F. The Sixth Cause of Action claims that Conder 
gave to Diane Mills property belonging to the Decedent which 
included a stereo, living room set, dining room set, Lazy Boy 
recliner, couch and love seat, drift boat, camping equipment 
including a spring bar tent, a 2 person tent, Coleman stoves and 
lanterns, a large Coleman heater, a small Coleman heater and 
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several coolers, all of which was reasonably with the sum of 
$3,000.00. Appellant adduced substantial evidence to support the 
claim. (R. 804-814; 843-845) 
G. The Seventh Cause of Action claims that Conder 
gave Decedent's golf clubs and a naugahyde couch to Decedent's 
brother. Evidence was adduced by Appellant to support this claim. 
(R. 814; 827, 828) 
While the court may have found six of the seven claims 
without merit, the claims had evidence to support them, were 
debatable legally and they were brought in good faith. 
2, Cross-Appellants then claim Appellant should be 
charged attorney's fees for having the Conder & Wangsgard claim for 
fees approved by the Court. 
It was clear from Appellant's Petition to Remove Conder 
as Personal Representative that the main issue was whether the work 
had actually been performed for Decedent. (R. 24) The main thrust 
of Conder's deposition held on January 3, 1991 was whether (1) 
there were any fees due Conder & Wangsgard from the Estate of 
Decedent and (2) whether the claim had been presented, allowed and 
paid in conformity with the Utah Uniform Probate Code. (R. 1422-
1428; 1444-1456; 1459-1478) 
At the hearing held on January 15, 1991 the trial court 
ruled at (R. 931) as follows: 
The Court will appoint a Co-Personal 
Representative who will review all of the acts 
performed by the present Personal 
Representative and he will solely approve or 
disapprove the Conder-Wangsgard claim, and the 
claim must be approved by the court. 
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The stipulation entered into by Conder, Appellant's 
attorney and Guyon (R. 190-193) provided in part as follows: 
2. The newly appointed Co-Personal 
Representative will review all of the acts of 
the present Personal Representative and report 
on the said acts of to the Court and all 
parties hereto as to the current state of the 
probate; and the said newly appointed Co-
Personal Representative will solely approve or 
disapprove of the Conder and Wangsgard claim 
for attorney's fees in the sum of 
approximately $33,000.00 and the method of 
payment thereof which determination shall be 
made from evidence submitted by the interested 
parties and which claim for attorney's fees 
must be further approved by the Court. 
The method of payment refers to cash or the remodel job to be 
performed by Decedent's construction company. 
The stipulation further provided, "the court shall 
conduct a hearing on the question of (1) attorney's fees to be 
awarded, (2) surcharges and other objections to the closing of the 
Estate....". (R. 193) 
John Spencer Snow, having been appointed by the Court as 
a Co-Personal Representative on February 22, 1991 (R. 194) did not 
report at any time to the court with reference to the Conder & 
Wangsgard claim. The next thing that happened was that K.C. 
Bennett an attorney for Conder & Wangsgard and representing the 
"Personal Representative" filed a petition dated May 3, 1991 to 
submit for approval "the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's 
fees for legal services provided to the Decedent during his 
lifetime in the amount of $33,248.75 plus interest of $4,572.06 for 
a total amount of $37,820.81." (R. 250, 251) 
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Mr. Bennett obtained a hearing date on May 11, 1991 and 
a backup date on May 16, 1991. (R. 259) Appellant's attorney filed 
an objection to both of these hearing dates to the petition for the 
Conder & Wangsgard attorney's fees on five separate grounds, one of 
which was that John Spencer Snow had failed to make his report to 
the Court on the Conder and Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees and 
the method of payment thereof. (R. 253) 
Appellant's attorney filed a response to the petition for 
attorney's fees for Conder & Wangsgard (R. 269-272) and the initial 
hearing was held on the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's 
fees on June 14, 1991. 
The claim that Appellant reneged on the terms of the 
stipulation and was in direct violation of the stipulation is 
preposterous in light of the record in this matter. 
Mr. Snow was in default in his failure to report. It 
should be noted that Mr. Snow and Conder expeditiously sold the 
Decedent's construction business as of May 2, 1991 (the petition 
for the fees being dated May 3, 1991) so that the Conder & 
Wangsgard fees would have to be paid in cash and not in remodeling 
work on the Conder & Wangsgard office. (R. 190-206) 
Cross-Appellant's are trying to require Appellant to pay 
their attorney's fees for pursuing their own claim for attorney's 
fees incurred prior to Decedent's death which the trial court 
specifically would not allow. In fact, the trial court disallowed 
$5,000.00 when it should have disallowed $11,500.00 as the true and 
correct figure for processing this claim against their own 
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Decedent's estate. 
3. Cross-Appellant next attacks Dylon Husband, 
Appellant for his petition to remove Conder and his questioning of 
all other acts in conjunction with that role. 
Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by reference 
all of the arguments, record on appeal, and authorities cited in 
this brief and Appellant's brief to support the trial court's 
finding of no basis for charging Appellant with estate, personal 
representative or attorney's fees. In addition thereto: 
A. Appellant was only 17 at the time of the 
appointment of Conder as Personal Representative and his interest 
was represented by his mother, who had been appointed Conservator. 
Appellant was incompetent to nominate or object to or approve the 
appointment of Conder as Personal Representative contrary to the 
argument in Cross-Appellant's brief. (R. 839) 
B. Conder failed to disclose the Decedent's debt 
for attorney's fees to Conder & Wangsgard prior to his obtaining 
waivers and securing his appointment as Personal Representative in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-611 (2) (b) . (R. 24; 910-914; 
1049-1052; 1417-1422) 
C. Conder received the support and testimony of 
Karen Husband, Conservator of the Estate of Lindsay Husband, the 
other heir, and the testimony and support of Peter Guyon, her 
attorney throughout the proceedings. It is submitted that the 
reason for this support was due to Karen Husband's claim for 
alimony and support in the approximate sum of $4,500.00 which was 
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challenged by Appellant in his objections to the Petition for the 
Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution. (R. 484-488) The 
particulars of the objection being set forth in detail at (R. 485) . 
The claim for past due alimony and support money was supposedly 
made on June 21, 1990, but was not approved until April 2, 1992. 
(R. 710; 727-730) The claim of June 21, 1990 was not paid even 
though there were sufficient funds as early as July 5, 1990 with 
which to pay the said claim. (R. 107) This was a payoff to Karen 
Husband and her attorney for their testimony and support of Conder 
in this and other matters in light of their failure to file a 
timely claim for the alimony and support money. 
D. Conder, as Personal Representative was allowed 
to testify and repeatedly misstated the facts for the trial court 
involving dealings with Appellant's attorney and Appellant's 
attorney made repeated efforts to testify and place the truth 
before the trial court. These efforts were rejected by the trial 
court for ethical reasons and the trial court wanted Appellant's 
attorney to withdraw and for Appellant to hire a new attorney as if 
there were not enough attorneys involved and attorney's fees being 
run up at this point. (R. 769-771; 773-774) 
B. Throughout all of the proceedings Conder's 
testimony on occasion was untruthful (R. 1031-1048), evasive and 
non-responsive. (R. 749-752) The remarks in Appellant's brief 
under Point V about Conder are incorporated herein for the court's 
further consideration. 
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All of Appellant' s petitions, objections, surcharges were 
successful, partially successful and if unsuccessful always 
supported by evidence, had a basis in law therefor, and were 
asserted in good faith. This was readily apparent to the trial 
court during the pendency of this action and was the reason for his 
finding of no basis for awarding attorney's fees or other charges 
as against Appellant, Cross-Appellant has again failed to marshall 
the facts in accordance with Robb v. Anderton, supra. The findings 
and order of the trial court should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
All issues and points on appeal raised by Cross-Appellant 
should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ) % day of April, 1994, 
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W. Guyon, Attorney for Lindsay Husband, 14 Newhouse Building, 10 
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Scott R. Wangsgard, 
Attorney for Personal Representatives, 4059 South 4000 West, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84120. 
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